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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Panelists
PROF. KATSORIS: We move on to our next topic, which will be
covered both today and on December 5th,95 and that is the issue of
punitive damages. I'm now relieved of my role as moderator and as-
sume the role of gladiator, and will present what I think is the public's
point of view.
Punitive damages are receiving a lot of attention lately. In TXO v.
Alliance,96 the Supreme Court permitted a ten million dollar punitive
award to stand, which was 526 times compensatory damages. 7 In
New Mexico, a jury recently awarded $200,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $2.7 million in punitive damages to a claimant who acciden-
tally spilled a cup of hot coffee on herself.98 Are these awards
unsettling to the business community? The answer is yes!
The Supreme Court has broadly announced that the Constitution
imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages" and that
we must guard against the "extreme results that jar one's constitu-
tional sensibilities."'1 Yet the Supreme Court has basically issued no
guidelines in determining the constitutional limits on punitive awards.
In addition to this lack of guidance, a new obstacle surfaced this
past summer when the Supreme Court in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg'0' held that the limited reviewability provided under Oregon
law for punitive damages renders such awards unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.I02 Finally, there
are those in the securities industry who feel that the industry should
be immune from punitive damages because the industry is already ad-
equately restrained through regulation, disciplinary proceedings, and
compensatory damages.103 The public does not buy that argument,
nor do the courts. If the securities industry wants a clearer punitive
95. See infra pp. 1651-78.
96. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
97. Id. at 2718.
98. Big Jury Award For Coffee Burn, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5 (awarding
2.7 million dollars in punitive damages to an 81-year-old woman who suffered third-
degree burns after coffee spilled on her lap); McDonalds Cup of Scalding Coffee: $2.9
Million Award, Chi. Trib., Aug. 18, 1994, at Cl. The trial judge subsequently reduced
the punitive award to $480,000. See Judge Reduces Award in Coffee Scalding Case,
Chi. Trib., Sept. 14, 1994, at C2.
99. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
100. See id. at 18.
101. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
102. Id. at 2341.
103. See John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Samoff, Punitive Damages in Arbitration,
N.Y. LJ., Aug. 18, 1994, at 3; William J. Fitzpatrick, Address of the General Counsel
of the Securities Industry Association Before the New York County Lawyers Associa-
tion (May 29, 1991).
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damages terrain, the industry should support broad tort reform, not a
surgical strike through arbitration.
Let us now focus our discussion on securities arbitration. A few
years ago, I compared the confused state of punitive damages in se-
curities arbitration to the biblical Tower of Babel.1" This Babel-like
confusion is basically caused by three facts:
1) In 1976, the year before the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration was created, the New York Court of Appeals in Gar-
rity,105 in a four-to-three decision, held that arbitrators lacked au-
thority to award punitive damages, even if agreed to by the
parties;10 6
2) Eleven years later (1987), the McMahon"'7 decision virtually
made securities arbitration mandatory;"°8 and
3) Once arbitration became mandatory, brokerage firms, with
greater frequency, began inserting a New York choice-of-law
clause1 °9 making New York law applicable. The industry's ration-
ale is that this choice-of-law clause exports the Garrity prohibi-
tion, no matter where the investment transaction occurred or
where the arbitration hearing was to be held.
Four federal circuits, the First,""° Eighth,"' Ninth,"' and Elev-
enth, 113 basically disagree with that rationale; two circuits, the Sec-
ond'14 and the Seventh,"a5 agree that the Garrity prohibition prevails.
Such diversity among the circuits causes havoc, as litigants jockey to
have their arbitrations held in friendly circuits. Fortunately, light soon
104. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The
Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 Fordham Urb. LJ. 573, 574 (1991) ("[I]t often appears as
though the courts and legislatures were creating a 'Tower of Babel' by discussing the
issue in different languages and dialects.").
105. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
106. Id. at 795.
107. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
108. Il at 226.
109. See Michael Siconolfi, Regulators Examine Smith Barney Over Limits On Ar-
bitration Claims, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at C1.
110. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1989) (label-
ling Garrity as "an anomaly, frustrating the goals of fairness and finality").
111. Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1993).
112. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991)
("We hold that the expansive view that has been taken of the power of the arbitrators
to decide disputes ... provided the arbitration panel here with authority to make the
punitive damages award.").
113. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988)
(stating that Garrity "dealt only with the power of arbitrators under state law and
public policy, and has no application in cases arising under the Arbitration Act").
114. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1991).
115. On March 6, 1995 the United States Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, re-
versed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the arbitration panel's punitive damage
award. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
1820, at *21 (U.S. March 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994).
1572 [Vol. 63
SYMPOSIUM
may be forthcoming with the Supreme Court's recent granting of certi-
orari in Mastrobuono.1 6
In addition to this issue of exporting Garrity through choice-of-law
provisions, some now argue that the Honda decision raises new obsta-
cles to the granting of punitive damage awards in arbitration, on the
ground that their limited reviewability in arbitration results in the de-
nial of due process. This Honda argument is an interesting wrinkle,
yet in McMahon the Court unanimously sanctioned RICO' claims in
arbitration," 8 which provides for treble damages, and, in my mind,
treble damages are punitive in nature.
How the Supreme Court will ultimately rule on these matters is
anybody's guess, and speculation is rampant. I see articles on it every
day. No matter how the Court rules, problems will remain.
I would like to backtrack for just a minute and examine SICA's role
in all of this. After McMahon, and because of the increasing trend
towards more restrictive agreements, SICA amended section 31 of the
Uniform Code by adding subdivision (d), which specifically prohibits
any condition in arbitration agreements that "limits the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award."" 9 So far, the clear language of sec-
tion 31 does not seem to have received much attention from the courts
in-so-far as it restricts the use of choice-of-law clauses and other simi-
lar clauses, which in my judgment clearly attempt to limit the ability of
the arbitrators to make awards.
In addition, a few years later, in order to highlight arbitrators' au-
thority, SICA added section 28(h) to the Code, which provides that
"arbitrator(s) may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator(s)
deem just and equitable and that would have been available in a court
with jurisdiction over the matter."'120 Section 28(h) is similar, though
not identical, to the language in the AAA rules. 2 ' Unfortunately,
although it was adopted by SICA nearly three years ago, this amend-
ment has yet to be adopted by any SRO. The NASD has considered
alternatives to this rule, but it has not yet arrived at a conclusion. Ap-
116. The Supreme Court has since rendered its decision in Mastrobuono. Id.; see
also BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted, No. 94-
896, 1994 WL 664702 (Ala. Jan. 23, 1995) (appealing a two-million dollar punitive
damage award for suppression of a material fact). For a summary of BMW, see Paul
M. Barrett, Supreme Court Will Revisit the Debate Over Punitive Damages in BMW
Case, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1995, at B4.
117. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988).
118. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
119. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 31(d), at 24 (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 28(h), at 21 (emphasis added).
121. See American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules § 42(c),
AAA164-20M-4/93, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WIL 495385, at *12 ("The arbitra-
tor may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and
within the scope of the agreement of the parties .... ").
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parently, however, some proposals are being considered by the
NASD"z in this regard:
First, a ceiling on punitive damages should be created;
Second, punitive damage awards should be reasoned, that is, they
should state the legal basis for the award;
Third, such awards should be more readily appealable than com-
pensatory arbitration awards;
Fourth, qualification standards for arbitrators should be upgraded;
Fifth, punitive damages should be considered in separate arbitration
proceedings; and,
Sixth, claimants who win punitive damage awards should pay a por-
tion thereof to the state, federal and quasi-governmental regulators. 2 3
Let's now go back to the Supreme Court and the Mastrobuono ap-
peal. No matter which way the Supreme Court decides Mastrobuono,
some accommodation will have to be made by both sides. If the
Supreme Court rules for the claimants, the industry would no doubt
press for some form of reviewability.
What if the Supreme Court rules for the industry? Frankly, I find it
difficult to accept such a result because of the underlying unfairness of
forcing people into arbitration and then inserting clauses that directly
or indirectly prohibit substantive relief that they could otherwise re-
ceive in court.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has not yet found securities
arbitration agreements to be unenforceable as contracts of adhesion,
that was considered before arbitration became mandatory and when
arbitration agreements were still relatively simple. Arbitration was in-
tended to provide a speedier and more economical procedural alter-
native to courtroom litigation. Arbitration was not intended to be
used as a Trojan Horse from which to deny relief otherwise available
in court through the use of restrictive clauses in arbitration
agreements.
In any event, however, I never answered the question: What if the
Supreme Court rules for the industry in Mastrobuono? I respectfully
predict that in that case the public will not rest until such a rule is
overturned either by the legislature, in the marketplace, or through
the courts.
Anticipating a Honda-type problem in my Tower of Babel article,1 4
which was written over two years before Honda, I suggested, as part
of an overall trade-off, broader reviewability of punitive damage
122. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., NASD Notice to Members 94-54 (July
1994).
123. Id.
124. See Katsoris, supra note 104.
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awards.1" Such broader reviewability, as painful as it is-because it
adds to the expense and duration of the proceeding-would go a long
way towards allaying the industry's fears about catastrophic punitive
awards.
If, however, the industry insists upon excluding punitive damages
altogether in securities arbitration, then we must make securities arbi-
tration voluntary once again. It's noteworthy that in the Prudential
global settlement process, 126 two troublesome areas are excised by
stipulation: One, the defense of the statute of limitations cannot be
raised and two, no punitive damages can be awarded. Those were
significant trade-offs. The big difference, however, is that in the Pru-
dential situation the arbitration procedure is voluntary not mandatory.
You cannot force people into arbitration and then "cherry-pick" away
their substantive rights.
As far as the NASD is concerned, I respectfully suggest that it delay
issuing any punitive damage recommendations before Mastrobuono is
decided, and thereafter work with SICA, the other SROs, the SEC,
the industry, and the public in forming a compromise in this area that
is fair to all.
Now, to present a decidedly different point of view, I introduce my
good friend, John Peloso.
MR. PELOSO: I wish I could assume the mantle of the "public,"
since it's such a wonderful mantle to have over you. It is as if the
public has truth and justice on its side and everybody else does not.
I'll make a couple of observations, and then let me make some sugges-
tions as to why punitive damages are not appropriate in arbitration.
To begin with, I think there are two premises in the points you
made, Gus, that are not entirely correct. The two premises are, one,
that the Supreme Court "mandated" arbitration and, two, that there is
a "substantive right" to punitive damages. I don't think either of those
is exactly correct.
All that the Supreme Court did in the McMahon case was hold that
the securities laws did not preclude people from agreeing to arbitrate
securities claims. There is a world of difference between those two
thoughts because, as we all know around this table, the whole point of
arbitration is that it is a consensual thing and people can agree or not
agree to whatever they please. So, nobody is forcing anybody to do
anything.
125. Katsoris, supra note 104, at 603 ("If punitive damages in arbitration are not
generally reviewable, while those obtained in courtroom litigation are, then the arbi-
tration playing field would tilt in favor of claimants.").
126. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Prudential Sec. Inc., CA. No. 93-2164
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993) (Fourth Quarterly Report of Claims Administrator).
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The second questionable premise is that punitive damages are a
"substantive right."' 27 I think when you go back into the cases and
the history of punitive damages, you will find that this is not true at
all. To begin with, this whole controversy in the courts got started in
1976 with Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., -8 in the context of whether arbi-
tration agreements should be construed and enforced under New
York law. But, as often as I hear people talk about that case, I never
hear anybody talk about what the rationale of the case was.
The rationale of the case, which is to be given some weight, is that
when you go back into the history of punitive damages, to the extent
that they were considered to be appropriate, to the extent that puni-
tive damages was a right or a remedy, the power to grant them lay
with the state."29 It was not a right of an individual. The only right
that an individual should have is to prove his or her damages.
Whether somebody should be punished for an egregious activity is not
something that a private citizen had a right to determine. It was
rather something that was the province of the state. Therefore, judges
had that power. So, the concept was that even if two people agree to
arbitrate a dispute, neither of them has the power to convey to an
arbitrator the power to punish; that power comes from the state.
There is a real question in my mind as to whether any private indi-
vidual in our society, as opposed to the state and the judges who are
given that authority, should have the right to punish another individ-
ual. That is the rationale of Garrity and that is what is at the heart of
this whole question.
The reasons why punitive damages are not appropriate for arbitra-
tors to award are several, in my opinion. I think the strongest is the
due process point that you mentioned, Gus, that was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in the Honda decision.130 The
Court recognized that if there were circumstances where it was appro-
priate to punish somebody for his or her activity, because that activity
was so egregious, then there ought to be procedural safeguards to
make sure those kinds of judgments are made under the right
circumstances.
Now, the law going back into our history is replete with cases where
the procedural safeguards have been held to be correct, correctly ap-
plied, or not, and those safeguards include such things as: what was
the level of activity of the people involved, to what extent was it so
bad that it required punishment, what was the legal basis for imposing
127. But see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 1820, at *18 (U.S. March 6, 1995) (referring to punitive damages as "an impor-
tant substantive right").
128. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
129. Id. at 794.
130. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
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punitive damages, what standards were applied, and what level of in-
tent to violate the law or harm someone was involved.
So, the question becomes, what assurances do any of us have that
arbitrators will apply those kinds of standards in handing down an
opinion that will punish somebody, particularly if the arbitrators don't
write an opinion, and even more particularly, if they don't give the
reasons for what they have done.
That is a serious problem and it is the problem that is recognized in
the Honda case,' because if those procedural safeguards are not
present, then there is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in our
procedures, and those things are very important to us.
A second reason why I suggest to you that punitive damages are not
appropriate in the securities industry is because it is such a heavily
regulated industry. To make my point, I have to go back a little bit in
history. If you read back into the history of punitive damages in our
jurisprudence, you will find that there are two essential purposes that
were advanced by a concept of punitive damages. To get right down
to it, "punitive damages" is a phrase that is a contradiction in terms.
When you study the history of punitive damages, you will find that it
grew as a way of preventing and deterring crime.
Typically, the reason common law courts started awarding so-called
punitive or exemplary damages was to make an example of people in
situations where the law couldn't handle it, or where it was not likely
that the case would be prosecuted. 132 It was to fill a gap.
I suggest to you that, in this industry, there surely is not any gap!
You have the Securities and Exchange Commission, you have the De-
partment of Justice in appropriate circumstances, you have the New
York Stock Exchange, the NASD, the American Stock Exchange, the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange, and if that's not enough, you
have the entire plaintiff's bar, half of which is sitting around this table,
who are just chomping at the bit to bring people to justice.
Under those circumstances, why do you need punitive damages?
The history of that concept in our jurisprudence is to deter and pre-
vent crime. We don't need it in the securities industry. You have
about as much deterrence as anybody can stand, and some people
might think a little bit too much.
The third point is that there really shouldn't be a right to punish
someone. It's just a conceptual thing. Why should a private litigant
get a windfall profit because that person has brought a case for certain
losses? If a defendant or respondent has acted so badly as to deserve
punishment, even if somebody is going to punish that person, why
131. Id. at 2340.
132. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L Rev. 1269, 1322-24
(1993); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Dam-
ages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 2033, 2051 (1986).
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should money flow to the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney-unless
the plaintiff's bar wants to give up any right to those punitive dam-
ages? That would be a positive step forward, it seems to me, for those
who are urging punitive damages. So, I question whether there is any
right to it. Even if somebody should be punished, why should the ben-
efit run to the plaintiff?
The whole point here is that if there is this power to punish, if it
exists at all in civil cases-and I think it's questionable in the securi-
ties industry-it should reside in the courts and in the state.133 In any
event, any amount of money so levied against a defendant certainly
shouldn't go to a private litigant.
Discussion
PROF. KATSORIS: Before I throw open the floor for comment, I
would like to comment on something that John mentioned.
I said McMahon made arbitration basically mandatory, meaning ab-
sent cash accounts, most people must sign a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement when opening an option or a margin account. 134 So, I
think most of us will readily admit that McMahon basically did make
it mandatory.
MR. PELOSO: I don't agree.
PROF. KATSORIS: As far as punitive damages in court, you men-
tion that well-trained judges make those decisions. Yet, juries also
award punitive damages, and they are less trained than arbitrators.
So, I don't agree with your conclusion.
Moreover, when I used the term substantive rights, I meant it in the
broad sense that if you can get punitive damages in court, you should
be allowed to get them in arbitration. That's my point.
MR. PELOSO: I just want to comment on this point: It's unfair to
say that juries are less trained than arbitrators. The whole point is
that, as was said in the Honda case, if juries are going to return ver-
dicts with punitive damages, they are tightly controlled or should be
tightly controlled by the judge's charge to the jury.135 That is under
the control of the judge, and there is a right to appeal.
While arbitration is a perfectly fine forum for resolving disputes,
you don't have any procedural safeguards, such as someone telling the
arbitrators what standards to apply. I was going to comment that I
thought the NASD subcommittee suggestions were really well thought
out and go a long way to solving most of these problems.
133. See Ira P. Rothken, Comment, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration:
A Due Process Analysis, 21 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 387, 397 (1991). But see Stephen
J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in
Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 529, 561-64
(1994).
134. See 1992 GAO Report, supra note 54, at 28.
135. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994).
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PROF. KATSORIS: That's what I was going to mention, once com-
ments subsided. I was going to go back to the NASD suggestions, and
although some were a little bit overlapping, I think we can use them as
a foundation for discussion from which we might be able to build a
consensus for the future.
MR. BECKLEY: The linchpin of the argument is apparently a his-
torical one, that punitive damages historically lay in the hands of the
state and not private individuals. I think historical argument in this
case is very perilous because, historically, arbitration was inappropri-
ate and looked down upon by the courts, and even though both par-
ties agreed to an arbitration they could go into court and get an
adverse decision set aside.136
If we're going to rely upon the early history, we're not going to be
here very long because arbitration would be back where it was, and as
Garrity sort of enshrined, it's really a suspect procedure and most sus-
pect when it involves punitive damages. If we were going to rely on a
historic approach in which only the state can punish, SROs wouldn't
have any authority either because they certainly weren't known in
common law. They are a creature of recent legislation. If only the
state can punish, then no broker can be barred from the industry by
the NASD or the New York Stock Exchange.
So, I don't think we can go too far with history. What we can go
pretty far with is that the common law solved problems as they arose
as an instinctive result of the Judeo-Christian ideal of justice. When a
situation was not being addressed adequately by the state, by a regula-
tory organization or by informal groups such as the high-powered
courts, punitive damages arose as a way in which the individual citizen
could somehow say, "Enough." Through the use of the jury system,
which brings the common sense of the community to dispute resolu-
tion, the community could say, "Enough."
Is the community saying "Enough" in the second part of John's ar-
gument, which is that this is a heavily regulated industry? No, it's not.
The community isn't saying "Enough, enough." The gentleman sit-
ting to John's right works for an organization that, although it was
very, very heavily regulated, only recently added another $330 million
to the pot rather than suffer an indictment in the Southern District of
New York.
The layers of regulation that Prudential is encountering, or had to
deal with every day, didn't stop the damage. Mr. Milken was able to
put together an enormous and successful junk bond operation. None
of the regulators ever looked into it until well after the fact.
John knows and I know that for every Business Conduct Committee
proceeding there must be another five brokers out there who are flip-
ping mutual funds, telling little old ladies they really need this CMA
136. See Ian R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law § 4.1.2 (1994).
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account, telling people there are really still tax advantages in limited
partnerships. There isn't enough money or time for the regulators on
any level-SRO level, state level, national level-to get all the people
who are drawn to the industry because of the immense compensation.
The only reason for punitive damages is that the regulators can only
do so much, and the fear this industry has of punitive damages is the
best safeguard protecting the investing public.
When the first five million dollar hit comes down against a major
wirehouse, and by the way, there hasn't been one so far that I know
of, the next Monday the branch managers all over the United States,
at whatever house it is, will be on the horn saying, "Look guys, last
week we took a five million dollar hit in an arbitration with one mem-
ber of the industry sitting on the panel because somebody churned a
widow's account from a hundred thousand bucks down to a $50,000
debit balance and it cost the firm five million." That will have a far
more deterrent effect than any compliance lecture that a branch man-
ager can give.
MR. LIPNER: On the subject of non-compensatory damages, we
go sometimes from talking about punitive damages to talking about
attorneys' fees, I saw Mike lump them together a few minutes ago. A
word about attorneys' fees as a remedy, because I think it's wrong to
automatically lump punitive damages and attorneys' fees together.
There are some arguments that are properly addressed to tort re-
form, to an agreement, to an arbitrator, to a court, as to why punitive
damages should not be appropriate in a given instance or why they
wouldn't be appropriate in a situation. Attorneys' fees fall into a dif-
ferent category. When we have statutes that permit the recovery of
attorneys' fees or that authorize treble damages, which are in a sense
non-compensatory, they need to be given effect in an arbitration sys-
tem, even if you decide or it is decided for us that punitive damages
are not appropriate.
But, to get back to the punitive damages point for a minute, John
points out, from the Garrity case, the notion that the state should be
the sole engine for distributing punishment. It is the sole engine ra-
tionale that is closely linked in the Garrity decision to the evil manipu-
lator rational-the notion that arbitrators are easily manipulated by
the parties in securities arbitration.
As Judge Ash points out in the Kent137 case, the evil manipulator
rationale is on the other foot when it comes to securities litigation, and
the sole engine rationale, as appropriate as it might be to certain in-
dustries, must give way in an industry that is entrusted with the sensi-
tive fiduciary task of managing another person's money on a
commission basis. Whether it's truly the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court or not, when the industry is able to use arbitration agreements
137. In re Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 584 N.Y.S.2d. 483 (1st Dep't 1992).
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to supplant the state as the engine for adjudicating claims, punitive
damages in arbitration must be permitted. Otherwise, there is no one
who can effectively engage in this kind of deterrence, which is an im-
portant part of our jurisprudence, even in heavily regulated industries.
PROF. KATSORIS: I wanted to say something regarding Garrity.
First of all, the industry tries to export Garrity through choice-of-law
provisions, because some courts say that the parties have agreed that
New York law applies. Yet, you are applying a 4-3 decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, which states that you can't have punitive
damages in arbitration even if the parties agree othenvise. So, it seems
to me that Garrity itself is being inconsistently applied: you can use it
consensually to prohibit punitive damages, but you can't agree under
it to allow such damages.
Secondly, on Garrity, I understand that the New York County Law-
yers Association last year, or the year before, recommended to the
New York legislature that Garrity be overturned. 138
Let me add one other thing on appealability. I'm not in favor of
appealability of arbitration awards generally. I have fought appeala-
bility of arbitration awards since the beginning of SICA, but I do ap-
preciate the industry's concern on punitive damages. If the price of
punitive damages in arbitration is appealability of punitive awards, so
be it. We then might also have to facilitate that process by making a
better record and perhaps requiring a written opinion so as to make
the appealability of such awards more meaningful. I'm willing to ac-
cept that tradeoff. I don't know about the rest of the panel, but I'm
willing to trade appealability of punitive damage awards in arbitration
as the price for permitting punitive damages in arbitration.
MR. CELLA: I think in the securities industry you have to relate
the ability to award punitive damages directly to the problem the in-
dustry has had through the decades and still has, and that is the drift-
ing through the industry of the rip-off artist. Regrettably, managers
love to see producers, the broker-dealers love to see producers. This
is understandable. That is how they make their money. But amongst
them are people with a malevolent outlook and the outlook is to
pocket the money, enrich themselves, and abuse the public investors.
It seems to me the U-5 39 is a document whose lack of use or misuse
is a key to the problem. It's the bad guy who drifts from house to
house with a big book without the record reflecting the kind of con-
duct he engaged in, without the oversight of a manager who is happy
to get his overrides, that is the danger. That danger requires punitive
damages in arbitration. When you identify the bad guy, you don't let
him stay in the business, or you track him and know where he goes. If
138. New York County Lawyers' Association, Committee on Arbitration and
ADR, Punitive Damages: A Proposal For Relief 9 (July 12, 1993).
139. Form U-5, Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration.
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you get that under control, you needn't fear punitive damages because
the occurrence will be a negligent occurrence, an occurrence below
the standard for a punitive damage award. So, I see the linkage there
that really requires further effort on the part of the industry to get rid
of this type of broker who does the damage to the house and to the
public.
MR. PELOSO: I have one observation and one question. The ob-
servation is prompted by your remarks. My observation is that in
most of the cases that I've seen, which is a very, very small percentage
of the cases, the language that gets put into the U-5 is usually negoti-
ated by the broker's lawyer.
The question I really wanted to ask is this: What is the argument
for the claimant receiving the punitive damage award? That's what I
don't understand. Even if someone were to accept the concept that
punitive damages ought to be awarded by arbitrators to deter wrong-
doing and such, even if you accept that as necessary for this industry,
what is the rationale for the plaintiff getting it? Why isn't it more
appropriate for that money to get thrown into some fund somewhere
to fund arbitration or to fund law enforcement?
MR. CELLA: There is an answer to that, John. The answer is, first,
the plaintiff suffered the wrong and the wrong was a horrendous one
in order to meet the level of punitive damages. Second, he brought
the claim and proved the case at his expense, time, and whatever
other problems he had to bear to do it. Third, he had a skilled attor-
ney who presented his case and won it. And just as I have to pay back
the Worker's Compensation Board when I recover for a worker in a
tort claim in court, I have done my job for the compensation board as
well as my client, and I think the attorney is entitled to have his or her
fee calculated on the award. Those are the reasons I think punitive
damages are properly awarded.
MR. PELOSO: If that's true, you could solve it with attorneys'
fees, not punitive damages.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: That was the best idea you have had so far,
John. My recollection of the McMahon majority opinion, and I don't
really cite it often, is that the Wilko 4° Court was wrong in its distrust
of the arbitration system back in 1953.141 In fact, Justice O'Connor, as
I recall, writing the majority opinion, quoted from Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Wilko saying that, in effect, there was no evidence
that the arbitration system would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
which he is entitled. 4 2
Now, in McMahon, the claimant had a claim for RICO, as Professor
Katsoris stated, compensatory damages and punitive damages. The
140. Wfilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
141. Shearson/Amercan Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987).
142. Id. at 231.
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industry didn't argue to the Supreme Court in 1987 that arbitration is
great, or that arbitrators can do whatever a court can do, except for
punitive damages. The Court went ahead and sent the whole case to
arbitration. So, we have the McMahon majority saying that, in effect,
arbitrators can do whatever a judge and jury can do, and there were
no limitations passed.
MR. MEISTER: I think part of what I see is that virtually every
arbitration claim that comes in seeks punitive damages, 4 3 and I don't
think that's unique to our situation. Its probably regarded as malprac-
tice for a claimant's lawyer not to ask for them. That feeds into the
discovery issue that we talked about earlier. Because you're seeking
punitive damages, the whole discovery process broadens, and that cre-
ates a dog fight at some point in the system.
There is very little regulation or concern about assuming someone
did something wrong, who should punish him, and how many times he
should be punished. If, as is usually the case I've seen, when you get
to a point where there is legitimate concern about punitive damages,
the broker has undoubtedly gone, the manager may well be gone.
You may have settled with a number of other "victims" already. Pun-
ishment has already been meted out, and yet three or four different
lawyers are saying, "I want punitive damages to punish again and
again and again."
The message has gotten through to senior management that this was
a bad situation that could probably be fixed. That doesn't mean an-
other one isn't somewhere else. I think the concern we have is that
this is an unregulated, unreviewable area, where different people for
different reasons are all seeking punitive damages, and to determine
which case is deserving of punitive damages and which isn't is becom-
ing very difficult.
Moreover, I think if you had a situation where the industry said,
"Okay, we will accept the concept of punitive damages," probably
seventy-five percent of the damages should go to the SRO to help the
budget deficit for running the arbitration process. That would speed
the system along for all concerned, and you would limit, I think, the
motivation to seek punitive damages to those situations where they
were really merited.
Further, there ought to be some approach, and I'm not at all in a
position to suggest one, to indicate that if you punish a child for being
bad once, enough is enough. You couldn't keep punishing the child
over and over again for doing the same thing, or else you get a [malad-
justed] kid. I think that's really the concern. I don't think the notion
is that you send a message by awarding punitive damages, that senior
management hasn't figured it out already. I don't think that's valid.
143. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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MR. STONE: I was wondering whether Seth was advocating the
"English rule"'144 on attorneys' fees. I think there are some who might
opt for that.
I still haven't heard what money ought to go to the state, the New
York Stock Exchange, or the NASD in a punitive damage situation. I
think that would take out all of the incentive, and, to harken back to
some of the points I made earlier, make the case relate to the compen-
satory damages to the client. If you prove your punitive damage claim
and are successful, let it go to benefit where it can, not to this individ-
ual claimant. I don't think there is a good argument against that
position.
Second, regarding U-5s and U-4s, we have pushed very hard to get
some type of protection through defamation claims, to which we are
frequently subject. We try to be as candid as we can.
Finally, it seems interesting to me that Honda has singled out puni-
tive damages and treated it as different, and I think we have to here.
It is a different kettle of fish. It is a different concern, and again, I
think, if I harken back to some of the comments I made earlier, if we
can remove that issue from the arbitration process in the sense of
either having those funds go elsewhere, or providing a review of some
sort, as Professor Katsoris has said, I think it would move the arbitra-
tion process along quite well.
MR. ROBBINS: Last week the SEC submitted an amicus brief in
Mastrobuono.'45 Caite, can you tell us what the SEC's position is on
punitive damages in that case?
MS. McGUIRE: I can try. In summary, the Commission made
three arguments in its brief.
First, the brief argued that federal law prohibits the enforcement of
a contractual provision that limits remedies available to customers if
the remedies are available in court. This argument applies to agree-
ments executed after the September 1989 effective date of the arbitra-
tion clause rule.' 46
144. The "English rule" is equivalent to the loser-pays provision, which requires the
loser in an arbitration proceeding to pay the winner's costs. See Paul M. Barrett, Wa-
rily, Hatch Mulls Changes In Civil Justice, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1995, at Bi. In a recent
speech, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt said that he
opposes the loser-pays rule in securities litigation. See Subcommittee to Hold Another
Hearing on Securities Litigation Reform Measure, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 168 (BNA)
(1995). See generally Bad Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1995, at A18 (criticizing loser-
pays provisions). The United States House of Representatives recently passed a bill
that would require someone who brings an unsuccessful lawsuit to pay all of the court
costs and legal fees of the defendant if the judge deems the suit to have been poorly
grounded. Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Bill That Would Limit Suits of Investors, N. Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
145. SEC Brief, supra note 3.
146. Id at 10.
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Second, the brief argued that courts must accord substantial defer-
ence to arbitrators' construction of an arbitration agreement under
the Federal Arbitration Act.147
Third, the brief argued that the arbitrators did not exceed their au-
thority in the Mastrobuono arbitration by concluding that they had
the authority to award punitive damages because it is not reasonable
to construe an arbitration contract to constrain the arbitrators' reme-
dial power unless such constraint is made explicit in the contract-
something that was not done in the contract. 148
The brief is informed by the position that the Garrity rule is evi-
dence of judicial hostility to arbitration and is not consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in McMahon. Therefore, the brief stated
that punitive damages should be available in arbitration and indeed
that the New York Stock Exchange and NASD rules currently require
that they be available in arbitration for agreements entered into after
1989. It's just supposed to be an alternative dispute resolution system,
which is, in part, an answer to the question of why we should not tax
the awards by submitting them to the government or to the SRO
rather than to the plaintiff. The answer to that would be, "Because
that's not what the courts do."
Forty-one states allow for punitive damages. Most of the arguments
that have been made today against punitive damages are arguments
that should be addressed to the forty-one states, not to the New York
Stock Exchange. The New York Stock Exchange provides an alterna-
tive forum for the resolution of the same disputes that otherwise
would be resolved in court if people voluntarily agree wvith one an-
other that they will do that. You cannot say we'll just split it up. Par-
ties have to be in position to prove compensatory claims and punitive
damages claims in the same forum.
If there is going to be an alternative forum for the resolution of
disputes then you have to be willing to take on punitive damage
claims unless and until tort reform or some other thing comes along
that limits the ability to award punitive damages for the underlying
claims. I believe that's the SEC's position.
With respect to Honda, the brief cites the Mitsubishi149 decision for
the propostion that when people decide to use an alternative dispute
resolution system like arbitration, which does not have the kind of due
process layering that we've been discussing in connection with discov-
ery, and that sort of thing, that decision will be respected. 50 Those
procedures and the opportunity for review are traded for the simplic-
ity and speed of arbitration. By executing an arbitration agreement
147. Id at 12-19.
148. Id at 19-28.
149. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
150. SEC Brief, supra note 3, at 20 n.14.
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governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, a party consents to the limi-
tations on judicial review established in that Act.
As the Commission argued in McMahon, the voluntary decision to
resolve disputes through arbitration should be upheld. It shouldn't be
taxed and it shouldn't be limited to one kind of violation or another,
one kind of remedy or another. In fact, it should be a full alternative
dispute resolution system. That's what I take from the brief.
MR. KREBSBACH: The one question I still have is, as Jim was
saying before, if you have a five million dollar punitive damage award,
the branch manager of the firm is going to get the message. My ques-
tion is, given that as true, what happens if the punitive award comes in
at $500 million? There are absolutely no safeguards whatsoever, no
due process, nothing in place to protect defendants from having their
lives completely ruined, even if they did nothing wrong. There is re-
ally no right of appeal.
MS. McGUIRE: I agree, in large part. That's one of the things that
is a risk when you decide to move to a system that has no procedure
for appeals. Both sides decide to take their chances on arbitrators,
and it emphasizes more than anything else what we've said today re-
garding the importance of arbitrator education.151
Arbitrators really are the key. In its brief, however, the Commis-
sion stated that review under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act may well provide the opportunity for review of grossly excessive
awards under the "exceeding powers" standard. 5 ' Nevertheless, the
Commission staff has in the past, in discussions with both the plain-
tiff's bar and the defense bar, as well as with SICA, indicated that
because of the concern about rogue arbitrators, the one kind of SRO
rule that might establish a reasonable distinction between what courts
can do and what arbitrators can do would be a cap. The cap we've
suggested would be double compensatory damages.' 53 That certainly
is well within what I think litigators and courts would hope for. It
would be a very good deal.
Then the alternative that we also have put on the table, but I under-
stand why it hasn't been successful, is to allow those people who want
to claim punitive damages to resolve their cases in the court. That
would effectively put the firms back where they were before McMa-
hon. So, I understand why the firms haven't chosen to go there, but
that is an alternative.
151. For a discussion of arbitrator training, see infra pp. 1679-94.
152. SEC Brief, supra note 3, at 13-16.
153. A cap of two times compensatory damages has already been adopted by the
CFTC. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 222(c)(3)(ii),
106 Stat. 3590, 3616 (1992); see also CME Rule Proposal Permits Punitive Damages,
Sets Criteria, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 859, 859 (1994) (outlining a Chicago Mercantile
Exchange rule proposal that would adopt the punitive damages requirements of the
1992 Futures Trading Practices Act).
1586 [Vol. 63
The alternative is to say, "If you want the benefit of swift and
speedy resolution of your case, we at the New York Stock Exchange
are going to provide a forum for compensatory damages or compensa-
tory damages plus attorneys' fees." The Commission may be able to
approve such a rule, provided that appropriate disclosures are given to
investors, if it was done the same way as class actions. Class actions
exit the system; they go back to court.
As long as it's clear that you know best the limitations of the forum
in terms of what the arbitrators are capable of and what you can af-
ford to staff, the alternative is to send things back to court. It is not to
put people in a situation where they cannot obtain what they could
have obtained in court, and that's without discussing the litigation re-
form aspects at all, because I think the Commission has differing views
on litigation reform. Sometimes it emphasizes things like the fact that
there are a lot of layers in the system. Private damage actions includ-
ing punitive damage actions are one part of it. It's not like the CFTC
where you have exclusive rights. Securities regulation has always
been a layered system. The states provide for punitive damages for
common law fraud, but that's part of the deterrent system.
On the other hand, the Commission is sympathetic to calls for tort
reform in other areas and in certain cases. I don't think that's the
issue with respect to arbitration, because in my view, and this is my
personal view, the SROs cannot become laboratories for tort reform
because they are sufficiently dominated by the defense bar so that
they won't be able to obtain public credibility.
MR. CUMMINGS: What I'm hearing seems to be some insistence
that the securities industry has the best of both worlds. I disagree. We
have a procedure-and we're entertaining a large majority of what
could fairly be called junk claims. Plaintiff's lawyers could put an arti-
cle in the paper announcing, "If you lost money on this investment,
send it to me." That claim is going to receive a hearing, and a dollar
amount is going to be put on it because every claim today is worth
something. This is what the securities industry is giving to the public
investor. We're accepting the situation where we're going to a lot of
expense to provide a vehicle for every individual public investor who
feels he was wronged to have a hearing before three very responsible
people.
On top of that, we're supposed to say, "Okay, but if you then want
to go for the brass ring, you have to put in another clause and allege a
punitive damage claim which will then allow you to go to court." So,
we have to bear both this exposure on one side, which we're paying
for, and this potential on the other side.
The other phrase I keep hearing is that we should be able to get in
arbitration whatever we can get in court. I think the premise is that
arbitration and civil litigation aren't very different. Having done both
for years I can tell you they are very different. If a client came to me
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and said, "I'm entering a personal transaction. I'm going to build a
house for Joe. There is a clause in the contract that says any disputes
will be settled by arbitration, and I am subject to a punitive damage
award under the AAA procedures of arbitration. Should I sign it?" I
would say, "If you do sign it, I'm not your lawyer." I think it's as
simple as that.
PROF. KATSORIS: I would like to ask a question. I think Caite
brought up something very interesting-the issue that if you allege
punitive damages you should be able then to take it out of arbitration.
We have such a precedent in the Prudential global settlement with the
SEC, and we also have precedents in the class action cases. How do
you feel about that kind of exclusion option, Mike?
MR. STONE: You started with the premise that you have pre-
ordained how the court will come out in Mastrobuono. I'm not so
convinced that case is lost for the industry. Conceptually there are
some merits to that position. It does away with a lot of the problems
we discussed this morning. But John has really hit on a lot of the
factors that concern me.
We've set up a process here in arbitration that allows for a lot of
leeway, allows for a lot of benefits to the client, and I have some real
problems with Caite's position that there is a "right" to punitive dam-
ages. I think that issue is much more convoluted and difficult. I think
the issue that we've raised-and I think it's not entirely accepted by
some of the attorneys on the other side of the bench-is that I cannot
see any reason why the individual should benefit under the punitive
damage consideration.
If you're going to allow that to occur, I see no downside to allowing
that money to go elsewhere. If the concept is to punish, that end can
be accomplished without providing for, as John described it, the brass
ring to the individual. Let that individual be compensated. Let that
individual get the compensatory damages and attorneys' fees he or
she is seeking. But I have some concerns about the way the process
has been resolved. So, I have some doubts about it.
MR. LIPNER: Half of Mike's objection is toward punitive dam-
ages generally. I think Mike stands for a system in which you can't get
punitive damages in arbitration, and you can't get them in court.
That's the whole tort reform issue that I think is somewhat different
from the issue of whether they should be appropriate in arbitration. I
know there are a lot of investors who appreciate the beneficence of
the securities industry in setting up this nice arbitration system for us
to vindicate our claims.
The fact of the matter is arbitration has benefits for both sides. It
doesn't just run toward the investor. We have attorneys, in-house,
who try cases in states in which they are not admitted to practice. We
have no depositions. We have all kinds of things in the securities arbi-
tration realm that are beneficial to the industry and even though
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there may be instances where we could agree that arbitration isn't ap-
propriate or we should just abandon the system altogether, the fact of
the matter is it's here, and I don't see it disappearing.
So, the question is, given that system, whether punitive damages are
appropriate. The broader question is whether punitive damages are
appropriate generally or whether the industry is being beneficent in
offering us this system but feeling that they are setting themselves up
for some big fall at the same time. I think both of those are a bit off
the track of the narrow question of whether securities arbitration is an
appropriate forum for punitive damages, and whether the New York
choice-of-law clause is an appropriate vehicle for restricting punitive
damages.
I might add that in situations where a punitive damage award is
inordinate, for example, the $500 million punitive award on a $500
compensatory award, I assume that the court's power to set aside an
irrational award or one in manifest disregard of the law would do a
very nice job to put an end to that.'I
MR. KREBSBACH: Even after the TXO' 5 decision?
MR. LIPNER: I think so. I see it rarely exercised. We all say the
arbitrators acted irrationally. We all think that after we win, lose, or
draw. But the fact of the matter is that something that's way out of
line like that, I think that there are some mechanisms for getting it set
aside, including the bankruptcy laws, which might be appropriate to a
firm being penalized $500 million.
MR. CUMMINGS: I have one other comment. If arbitration were
imposed by state law, and punitive damages available in arbitration
were imposed by state law, is there any doubt in anyone's mind that if
that came up before the Supreme Court, even with appellate proce-
dure, that would be struck down?
PROF. KATSORIS: Let me just address one thing. I started my
discussion on punitive damages by saying that no matter how the
Supreme Court comes down in Mastrobuono, we would still have to
come back to the table for some sort of consensus. In this regard,
however, you need some sort of trust. Yet, since McMahon made ar-
bitration mandatory, what's been the public's experience with the in-
dustry? There has been a big push to include choice-of-law clauses.
Lately I've seen clauses seeking to litigate the six-year eligibility rule
in court instead of being decided by the arbitrators.15 6 What else is on
the industry's shopping list?
Once you have the public in the clutches of arbitration, what other
restrictions are you going to squeeze into the arbitration agreement?
154. See Ware, supra note 133, at 570 (arguing that arbitration law and contract law
provide the tools necessary for avoiding enforcement of truly shocking arbitral
awards).
155. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. C. 2711 (1993).
156. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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That's the mistrust by the public on this issue. Once you have made
arbitration mandatory, it has to be an absolutely fair ball game. I
think that's where the problem is.
MR. LIPNER: The fact of the matter is that the enforceability of
the arbitration agreement forecloses the alternative to find a forum
where punitive damages are available.
MR. CUMMINGS: Seth, you're talking about beginning a relation-
ship with a broker-dealer where you want to be secure that you can
get a punitive award if anything goes wrong, if you give it enough time
and effort.
MR. LIPNER: That's really not what happens because punitive
damages are awarded in such a small percentage of cases. 157 The law-
yer who is out there shopping for cases that have some value, as you
put it, but that really aren't very viable-if they are not viable on a
compensatory level and the lawyer is willing to take them because
what the heck, that's his opinion, how viable are they?
MR. CUMMINGS: We're talking about the whole brass ring con-
cept. If you have the ability to recover punitive damages in arbitra-
tion, a case that could be settled for $50,000, let's say it's a suitability
case, is not going to settle. It's going to go to a hearing. Multiply that
by the hundreds of cases that are on the docket of the NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange and you have a system that's in real danger
of being abandoned by both sides.
PROF. KATSORIS: Playing devil's advocate, I read off to you six
alternatives of things considered by the NASD. Do you find any
acceptable?
To repeat: a) the ceiling on punitive damages; b) punitive damages
awards should be reasoned, they should state the legal basis for the
award; c) such awards should be more readily appealable than com-
pensatory arbitration awards; d) qualification standards for arbitrators
should be upgraded; e) punitive damages should be considered in a
separate arbitration proceeding; and, f) claimants who won punitive
damages should pay a portion to the state, federal, and governmental
regulators.
MR. PELOSO: There are a couple of other very important ones in
there, such as the need to show a certain level of scienter or intent,
number one, and number two, a burden on the claimant to prove the
case of punitive damages by a higher standard than clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
PROF. KATSORIS: I think all of this is negotiable. It is obvious
that some people don't want punitive damages in any manner, shape,
or form, no matter what the safeguards. I'm trying to at least breach
that stone wall.
157. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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MR. CUMMINGS: These are all approaches and means of com-
promise, but in the end, that's all it is. It's a compromise by the indus-
try. You have to remember, when punitive damages are awarded,
they are awarded by a jury and the judge is there. He watched the
whole thing.
PROF. KATSORIS: Not all judges are better than arbitrators.
MR. BECKLEY: Maybe we can get a little bit of closure on this.
John's original question was how come punitive damages go to the
individual.
Over the last two thousand years we have attempted with a great
deal of success to substitute money for blood, and the whole judicial
system is basically an attempt to eliminate the blood feud.
Even people who have received complete out-of-pocket damages
still, in these outrageous situations, have a great deal of outrage and
that will not be assuaged by sending off part of the punitive damage
award to the NASD or lighten the industry's burden of subsidizing the
arbitration process.
More importantly, though, we're sort of discussing all of this in a
vacuum. About two percent of the arbitration awards, by the last fig-
ure I'm aware of, granted punitive damages of any measure. What
was the largest award for a customer, around $177,000?
MR. RYDER: Punitive award? There was one for $3.5 million.' 58
MR. BECKLEY: So, we have it up to $3.5 million. Those cases,
punitive damage awards of any size, are a demonstration of terrible
case management. It meant whoever was assigned to the case and
whoever was supervising it decided that we've got a great case here
and we're going to bring it home.
Secondly, if the attorneys on the plaintiff's side are doing their job,
it is a very rare claimant who would sit there with an offer for one
hundred cents on the dollar and maybe even payment of some attor-
neys' fees, and still reject it. Would you want to go to a hearing and
take a chance at some indefinable amount of punitive damages rather
than take that offer? Most of the people who would be the appropri-
ate subject for a punitive damage award are people who have been
wiped out by the brokers. They don't have the luxury of saying, "I'll
put it all on the black and let it spin." They can't afford that luxury.
So, in an appropriate case, the manager would put that amount of
money on the table and the case would go away. They could do what
Merrill Lynch did in one case that I was handling. They insisted on a
settlement discussion that included the claimant, and after the settle-
ment discussion the claimant took double his out-of-pocket damages
and went home. It was very simple, but it was an example of excel-
lent case management.
158. Gage v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., NASD Docket No. 90-01371, 1992 WL 123187, at
*2 (NASD Mar. 10, 1992).
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That's how the industry can avoid this specter of opening up the
closet in the night and seeing these terrible things. It really won't be
there if they understand case management.
MS. MASUCCI: You referred to the NASD's Legal Advisory
Board subcommittee report that was published.159 I just want it clear
for the record that the report was written by the subcommittee on our
Legal Advisory Board. It was not voted on or adopted by any com-
mittee or board of the NASD. It was put out for comment to gain just
what this group is trying to gain, consensus as to what initiatives to
adopt.
We didn't receive a lot of comment letters back, but what we did
receive led us to conclude that we could not come to a consensus at
this time. Maybe there will be a possibility of it after Mastrobuono.
I was a little concerned regarding a comment that I believe I heard
Caite make earlier today. She should correct me if I am wrong. The
concern you had was the dominance of the SRO's staffs by the
industry?
MS. McGUIRE: No. I said SROs are dominated by the industry. I
don't mean their staffs. I think the New York Stock Exchange has a
board half public, half not public. The NASD's board, however, is
more largely member dominated, so any rules they adopt may reflect,
or appear to reflect, their affiliation with the industry, which is usually
in the defense posture. I think that this is not where I would start a
laboratory for tort reform. I don't think it would be perceived as
balanced.
MS. MASUCCI: The concern I had, which is also echoed in the
media, is the problem of the public's perception of how arbitration is
run at the SROs, and arguments such as that may indicate that it's
time again to look at a single arbitration forum or some other organi-
zational structure where the perception may not be as intense.
MS. McGUIRE: I guess I wouldn't need to contribute to the me-
dia's skepticism. I think we've been on record for a long time about
the fairness of and professionalism of the arbitration staffs. The peo-
ple who run arbitration programs do so in a way that is totally bal-
anced on a case-by-case basis.
I appreciate the opportunity to correct that because I don't support
a single forum.
PROF. KATSORIS: I think we're in agreement that we're not go-
ing to arrive at a consensus today on punitive damages. That's pre-
cisely why we also put it on the agenda for two weeks from now.
Maybe between now and then we can reflect on what was said today
and perhaps inch towards some consensus by the next meeting.
159. See NASD Notice, supra note 122.
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Before we leave the subject, I know you track punitive damage
awards, Rick. Can you tell us your experience on the number of cases
that have awarded punitive damages?
MR. RYDER: The statistics that have been quoted I don't think
are very far off. The General Accounting Office did a study of arbi-
tration as a whole-SRO arbitration as a whole-a couple of years
ago, and they found that at the SROs, punitive damages are requested
about twenty-eight percent of the time, and awarded a percentage of
that, so it came out to somewhere around three or four percent.'60
They found essentially the same thing at the AAA in terms of the
incidence of punitive awards, but at the AAA it was requested in
about forty-eight percent of the decided cases.161 It's not requested by
everybody, but it is commonly requested, no doubt about it.
In terms of the incidence or occurrences, though, GAO said some-
where around three or four percent. We looked at punitive damages
in the May 1993 Commentator and found it was around two
percent.162
We also took a look at proportionality-the question whether, as a
percentage of compensatory damages, punitive damages are way out
of line. There, I think, is where the arbitrators have shown the most
rationality. I can't give you a statistic offhand, but the ratio was less
than 2 to 1; 1.1 to 1 is what I remember. 63
So, it's been a good record. The total number of punitive damages
awards, I would say, is somewhere around 200 as far as we've logged,
maybe 250.164 They seem to be coming out around ten or fifteen a
quarter. The pace seems to be about the same as in the past.
The proportionality ratio still continues to be about the same.
Overall, when you get to the end of the day, it cost the industry, over a
three-year period, maybe twenty to twenty-five, in other words, ten to
fifteen percent of the total damages awarded to customers. It's an
emotional issue and important, but frankly its consequence is usually
exaggerated.
160. 1992 GAO Report, supra note 54, at 45.
161. Id.
162. Punitive Award Survey, Sec. Arb. Commentator, May 1993, at 7 (finding that
arbitrators awarded punitive damages in 2.1% of the cases in which compensatory
damages were awarded); see also Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Update Survey of
Securities Arbitration Awards, Sec. Arb. Commentator, Jan. 1995, at 13, 17 (reporting
that the incidence of punitive awards from May 1989 to December 1993, cumulatively
throughout all of the states, is 2.0% of all surveyed cases).
163. Punitive Award Survey, supra note 162, at 4.
164. The Securities Arbitration Commentator found a total of 221 awards in which
punitive damages were granted against a party. Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Up-
date Survey of Securities Arbitration Awards, supra note 162, at 13, 15.
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PROF. KATSORIS: We are going to cover this again at the De-
cember 5th session," so I would like to suspend further debate until
then.
I would again like to thank the New York Stock Exchange for put-
ting on this Symposium.
165. See infra pp. 1651-78.
